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We show that errors by credit rating agencies can have significant real effects on rated firms. 
Specifically, we find that firms increase investment and adjust their capital structure following an 
exogenous correction to the credit rating adjustment process that occurred through the 
implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 158 (“SFAS158”). 
Prior to SFAS158, Moody’s and S&P did not correctly account for the presence of minimum 
liability adjustments for off-balance sheet pension obligations. Since neither firms nor the rating 
agencies were aware of this error, SFAS158 exogenously corrected the errors in the rating 
agency adjustments, thus allowing us to identify the effect of changes in credit rating labels 
independent of changes in firm fundamentals. We show that firms with higher minimum liability 
adjustments pre-SFAS158 are more likely to experience an improvement in credit rating post-
SFAS158 relative to low minimum liability adjustment firms even though there is no detectable 
change in the credit quality of these firms relative to low minimum liability adjustment firms. In 
addition, firms with larger minimum liability adjustments are more likely to increase capital 
investment and shift capital structure toward debt financing post-SFAS158 relative to low 
minimum liability adjustment firms. Overall, our results indicate that credit rating errors have 
real economic consequences for rated firms because credit rating labels drive economic choices 
that are independent of firm fundamentals. 
JEL classification: G24, G34, D43  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The traditional function of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) has been the independent 
certification of corporate creditworthiness. Given the quasi-regulatory role that ratings have 
assumed, ratings are expected to be accurate (e.g., Sufi, 2007). In the wake of the financial crisis, 
the apparent lack of accuracy was criticized due to the failures of structured finance products 
(e.g., see US Senate (2011), and US House (2008) for discussion of the CRAs’ failures of ratings 
on mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations during the crisis). However, in 
response, the rating agencies suggested that this error was primarily due to a combination of 
unforeseen economic events and complicated modelling assumptions, and that such 
shortcomings do not have implications for their primary role as a gatekeeper for certifying 
corporate bonds. We challenge this position by providing evidence of systematic errors in the 
production of corporate credit ratings prior to the financial crisis that had consequences for 
firms’ credit ratings. In addition, we show that the correction of this error had real economic 
effects on firms’ level of investment and capital structure, consistent with the notion that credit 
rating labels influence real outcomes.  
Credit rating agencies develop adjusted financial statements by modifying reported 
financial statements to reflect credit-relevant items not recognized under U.S. GAAP. Many of 
these adjustments arise because rating agencies treat off-balance sheet financing, such as defined 
benefit pension plans (“pension plans”) or operating leases, as debt. Our study focuses on the 
implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 158 (“SFAS158”).1 
This statement requires that the overfunded or underfunded status of a firm’s pension plan be 
                                                        
1 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted SFAS158: Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit 
Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, an Amendment of FASB Statements Nos. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R) in 
September, 2006 (FASB (2006)). The standard became effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. 
The full statement is available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf. 
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recognized on its balance sheet. This information was previously disclosed in the notes to the 
financial statements. Thus, the standard generated no new financial information—it simply 
required the balance sheet recognition of a previously disclosed item. Prior to the implementation 
of SFAS158, there were potentially two pension liabilities, the Accrued Pension Cost and the 
Additional Minimum Liability (“AML”). Basu and Naughton (2017) find that the major credit 
rating agencies were only aware of the Accrued Pension Cost, and not the AML. As a result, the 
credit rating agency adjustments overstated the net pension liability by the amount of the AML, 
thus leading to higher values for adjusted leverage and lower corporate credit ratings. SFAS158 
eliminated the AML, thus exogenously correcting the error in the rating agency adjustments. An 
illustration of the credit rating adjustments for pension plans using actual S&P data is shown in 
Figure 1, and is described in detail in Section 3. 
SFAS158 is an effective setting to examine the economic consequences of changes in 
credit rating labels because the accounting standard change increases substantially the likelihood 
of a credit rating upgrade for firms with AML reporting requirements attributable to underfunded 
defined benefit pension plans. We empirically validate this conjecture by examining how firms’ 
credit ratings and credit quality changed around the implementation of SFAS158. To ensure 
comparability across treatment and control firms, we focus our analyses on firms with pension 
plans and estimate the effects of the credit rating error by separating our sample into two groups 
based on the size of the pre-SFAS158 AML adjustment. We document that high AML firms 
experience a statistically significant rating upgrade of 0.33 notches relative to low AML firms. 
We also document that the probability that a firm receives an upgrade is discontinuous based on 
the size of the pre-SFAS158 AML adjustment. High AML firms have a 29.2% chance of 
obtaining an upgrade during the year, compared with only 22.5% for low AML firms. 
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Conversely, high AML firms have only a 33.1% chance of obtaining a downgrade during the 
year, compared with 37.9% for low AML firms. We find no statistically significant difference 
with regard to changes in CDS spreads and hence credit quality of the high versus low AML 
firms around the implementation of SFAS158. As a result, the differences in credit rating 
changes do not appear to be driven by changes in firm fundamentals, but rather are a function of 
a correction to the credit rating process. 
Next, we examine how the correction to the rating agency process affected firm 
investment and financial policy using a difference-in-difference framework that compares the 
change for high AML firms to the change for low AML firms around the implementation of 
SFAS158. Across a variety of measures, we find that high AML firms increased corporate 
investment following SFAS158. This result is shown graphically in Figure 2 for capital 
expenditure. This figure shows that the average level of investment for high and low AML firms 
moves roughly in sync prior to the implementation of SFAS158, at which point the lines 
substantially converge. This figure and additional robustness tests that consider different time 
periods indicate that the effect of the change in credit rating labels that was caused by the 
correction in the rating agency adjustments had a fairly rapid effect on investment, and that the 
effect was relatively permanent. We find similar results when we examine changes in firms’ 
financial policies. We find a statistically significant increase in the use of long term debt, but no 
statistically significant change in equity issuance. In addition, we find that high AML firms were 
raising more capital relative to low AML firms. Collectively, our results suggest that changes in 
credit rating labels led to changes in corporate investment and financial policy. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. Our main contribution is to the 
literature that examines the effects of credit ratings on firm outcomes. This line of research has 
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found that credit ratings are important determinants of a firm’s capital structure (e.g., Sufi 2007; 
Kisgen, 2009) and its cost of capital (Beatty and Weber, 2003; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). Many 
of these prior studies are subject to omitted variables concerns because changes in ratings are 
correlated with changes in firm fundamentals. The SFAS158 setting allows us to examine more 
precisely whether rating changes affect firm investment and financial policy even when those 
rating changes are not driven by changes in firm fundamentals. As a result, we provide evidence 
that the changes in the credit rating label, independent of firm fundamentals, is associated with 
changes in firm investment and financial policy. 
We also contribute more broadly to the credit rating literature by documenting the 
economic consequences of errors in the production of corporate credit ratings in the pre-
financial crisis period. Prior studies have investigated the accuracy of issue credit ratings for 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), in part because 
of the prominent role that the underestimation of default risk for these instruments played in the 
financial crisis (e.g., deHaan, 2016). We document similar failings with respect to corporate 
credit ratings by showing that rating agencies did not accurately complete financial statement 
adjustments for pension obligations.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the literature and state our 
hypothesis. Section 3 summarizes our data collection and describes the SFAS158 setting. The 
results of our analyses are provided in Section 4, followed by our conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
In the credit rating literature, a significant body of research examines the determinants of 
credit ratings. These studies have shown that financial ratios and accounting variables such as 
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leverage, liquidity, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, and firm size are all determinants of a 
firm’s credit rating (e.g. Ederington, 1985; Blume et al., 1998; Kamstra et al., 2001; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006). A number of studies have also investigated how credit ratings change over 
time. For example, Amato and Furfine (2004) find that macroeconomic factors, such as GDP 
growth, influence credit ratings. Baghai et al. (2014) also ﬁnd that rating agencies have become 
more conservative in assigning corporate credit ratings over the 1985 to 2009 period. deHaan 
(2016) finds that the performance of corporate credit ratings improved after the financial crisis. 
A number of papers have also investigated whether the structure of the credit rating 
market induces biased ratings. This research has generally found that investor-paid rating 
agencies produce higher quality and lower ratings than issuer-paid rating agencies (Beaver et al., 
2006; Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2013; Jiang et al., 2012) and that issuer pay rating agencies bias 
their ratings (Griffin and Tang, 2011; Bolton et al., 2012; He et al., 2012; Opp et al., 2013). 
Becker and Milbourn (2011) examine how the ratings quality of incumbent rating agencies 
responds to the entry of a new rating agency. They find that when Fitch entered the market, the 
ratings quality of the incumbents (i.e., Moody’s and S&P) decreased.   
A smaller number of studies have investigated how regulatory changes affect credit 
ratings.  Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) find that the information content of both credit rating 
downgrades and upgrades is greater following the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). 
Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) ﬁnd that following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, 
rating agencies not only improved rating timeliness, but also increased rating accuracy and 
reduced rating volatility. Dimitrov et al. (2015) analyzes the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
corporate bond ratings. They find no evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act disciplines rating 
agencies to provide more accurate and informative credit ratings.  
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The area of research that this study most closely resembles is the area that examines the 
real consequences of credit ratings. This line of research has found that credit ratings are 
important determinants of a firm’s capital structure (e.g., Sufi 2007; Kisgen, 2009) and its cost of 
capital (Beatty and Weber, 2003; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). In addition, credit ratings are used 
in federal and state legislation, in capital adequacy rules issued by regulators, and in corporate 
debt contracts. The regulatory requirement that certain categories of institutional investors rely 
on ratings for their investment decisions has given rise to regulatory arbitrage, whereby investors 
derive benefits from the rating label itself as opposed to the actual informativeness of the rating 
(e.g., Partnoy, 1999; Opp, Opp, and Harris 2013). Prior research has also shown that credit rating 
announcements generate investor reactions via bond and stock prices, and that the reaction is 
greater for credit rating downgrades than for upgrades (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). 
Unlike this study, many of these prior studies are subject to omitted variables concerns 
because changes in ratings are correlated with changes in firm fundamentals. The SFAS158 
setting allows us to examine more precisely whether rating changes affect firm investment and 
financial policy even when those rating changes are not driven by changes in firm fundamentals. 
In this respect, our study is closely related to Almeida et al. (2007) who document the sovereign 
channel through which credit rating labels influence firm investment and capital structure. The 
main challenge in using the sovereign ceiling rule setting is the connection between the 
creditworthiness of firms in downgraded countries and the overall credit quality of those 
countries. To address this challenge, Almeida et al. (2017) adopt an empirical strategy that 
compares firm-years where the credit rating downgrade is more likely to be driven by the 
sovereign ceiling rule rather than firm fundamentals to other firm-years. Using this strategy, 
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Almeida et al. (2017) document that credit rating declines are associated with a decline in 
investment and decreased debt issuance.  
Our study complements Almeida et al. (2017) by examining another mechanism through 
which credit ratings can change without concurrent changes in firm fundamentals. Unlike the 
sovereign ceiling setting, the SFAS158 setting focuses on a large sample of US firms and on a 
correction that generates credit rating upgrades rather than downgrades. In addition, we do not 
have to control for macroeconomic effects as the credit rating changes our study focuses on are 
not due to a sovereign rule effect, but rather the correction of a rating agency error. Since neither 
the rating agencies nor the firms appeared to be aware of the error, we suggest that this allows us 
to make causal statements about how exogenous credit rating upgrades influence firm 
investment. We focus on two hypotheses, which we state in null form: 
 H1: The correction of errors in the rating process has no effect on firm investment.  
 
H2: The correction of errors in the rating process has no effect on firm financial policy. 
 
The tension in our line of research hinges on the sophistication of  markets and firms with 
respect to credit rating changes. To the extent that firms only respond to changes in credit 
quality, then there should be no change in either firm investment or financial policy in response 
to an exogenous credit rating upgrade. In contrast, if firms do base investment and financial 
policy decisions, in part, on the firm’s corporate credit rating, then there will be changes in both 
in response to an exogenous credit rating upgrade. If so, we would expect that a higher credit 






3. Description of Setting and Sample Selection 
We exploit SFAS158, which generated exogenous improvements in credit ratings for 
firms with Additional Minimum Liability (“AML”) reporting requirements under the prior 
accounting regime (Basu and Naughton, 2017). Prior to the implementation of SFAS158, there 
were potentially two liabilities, the Accrued Pension Cost and the AML. The latter liability only 
exists for firms with pension plans that are underfunded on an accrued basis. Basu and Naughton 
(2017) find that the major credit rating agencies were only aware of the Accrued Pension Cost, 
and not the AML. As a result, the credit rating agency adjustments overstated the net pension 
liability by the amount of the AML pre-SFAS158.  
An illustration of the S&P adjustment process for two sample firms is provided in Figure 
1. This figure shows the determination of the recognized pension liability on the unadjusted and 
adjusted financial statements for the year prior to and the year of SFAS158 implementation. As 
outlined in more detail in Basu and Naughton (2017), the intended goal of the rating agency 
adjustments was to record a pension liability equal to the funding deficit on a Projected Benefit 
Obligation basis. In Figure 1, however, the pension liability recognized on the adjusted financial 
statements exceeds this amount pre-SFAS158, but is exactly equal to it post-SFAS158. For 
example, Colgate has a funding deficit of $504 million as well as a recognized pension liability 
of $504 million on both the unadjusted and adjusted financial statements for 2006. In contrast, it 
has a recognized pension liability of $799 million on the adjusted financial statements for 2005, 
which exceeds both the recognized pension liability on the unadjusted financial statements of 
$361 million and the funding deficit of $528 million. For this example, it is difficult to argue that 
the pension liability on the adjusted financial statements ($799 million) should exceed the 
funding deficit ($528 million) for 2005. Moreover, it seems more than coincidental that the 
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excess difference is driven by an S&P liability adjustment ($438 million) that is very close to the 
additional minimum liability adjustment ($474 million). 
SFAS158 eliminated the AML adjustment by requiring that the total unfunded liability on 
a projected benefit obligation basis be recognized, thus automatically correcting the error in the 
rating agency adjustments. Basu and Naughton (2017) interviewed credit rating personal and 
reviewed internal documents to establish that neither S&P nor Moody’s was aware of this error. 
In addition, neither agency examined changes in credit ratings for firms affected by SFAS158 
which would have potentially shed light on the error. We follow other studies (e.g., Adelino and 
Ferreira, 2016) and focus on S&P's ratings history over other agencies' history because S&P 
tends both to be more active in making ratings revisions and to lead other agencies in re-rating 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). In addition, ratings announcements by S&P also seem to 
convey a greater own-country stock market impact and seem not to be fully anticipated by the 
market (Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999). 
We start with all US firms with non-missing long-term issuer credit ratings in the S&P 
Capital IQ database for the period 2004 to 2009. We merge these firms with the Fundamental 
File and Pension Item in Compustat. We eliminate firms that do not have pension plans, as our 
empirical approach relies on the magnitude of the AML, which is an accounting item that only 
exists for firms with pension plans. We also want to ensure that our treatment and control firms 
are similar, and we believe this is best achieved by focusing on firms with pension plans. We 
exclude all financial institutions (SIC codes “60-69”), utilities (SIC codes “49”), and 
governmental enterprises (SIC codes that begin with “9”). The resulting sample consists of 7,625 
firm-quarters from 360 unique firms, all of which sponsor a pension plan.  
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We control for items that prior research has shown influence either the level of 
investment or the credit worthiness of the firm. The specific control variables we use are: 
DEBTCOV (sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by EBITDA. If this 
number is negative, we set it equal to zero), NEG_DEBTCOV (indicator variable equals to one if 
DEBTCOV is negative, and zero otherwise),2 RENT (rental payments divided by total assets), 
CASH FLOW (cash and short-term investments divided by total assets), INTCOV (EBITDA 
divided by net interest paid), PROFIT (EBITDA divided by sales), PROFITVOL (standard 
deviation of PROFIT over the last five years, or at least the last two years if data is not available 
for the last five years), SIZE (log of total assets), LEVERAGE (long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities divided by total assets), TANGIBILITY (net property, plant, and equipment 
divided by total assets), and CAPEX (capital expenditures divided by total assets). Summary 
statistics for these variables are provided in Table 2. 
We use the SFAS158 setting to test the effect of credit rating labels on investment and 
financial policy by exploiting the fact that the correction to the rating process generated by 
SFAS158 is exogenous to firm fundamentals, and the probability that a corporate issuer will 
obtain a rating upgrade following the implementation of SFAS158 is discontinuous based on the 
size of the pre-SFAS158 AML reporting requirement. Our treatment firms are those with an 
AML above the median for all the firms in our sample (HIGHAML=1) and the remaining firms 
are the control firms (LOWAML=1). Across these two groups of firms, our data indicates that 
there is a significant difference in how credit ratings responded in the year SFAS158 was 
effective.  
                                                        
2 We do not allow DEBTCOV to be negative because large ratios of debt to EBITDA increases default risk while 
small ratios decrease default risk. When EBITDA is negative, the ratio becomes negative, while default risk actually 
increases further. Because we limit DEBTCOV to be positive, we capture the effect of negative values with the 
binary indicator variable NEG_DEBTCOV. 
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In Table 3 Panel A, we report the percentage of HIGHAML and LOWAML firms in our 
sample that experience a credit rating upgrade, no change in credit rating, or a credit rating 
downgrade during a sovereign downgrade year. HIGHAML firms have a 29.2% chance of 
obtaining an upgrade during the year, compared with only 22.5% for LOWAML firms. 
Conversely, HIGHAML firms have only a 33.1% chance of obtaining a downgrade during the 
year, compared with 37.9% for LOWAML firms. Overall, Table 3 Panel A shows that the credit 
rating of HIGHAML firms relative to LOWAML firms increases by approximately one-third of a 
notch in response to SFAS158. Importantly, the analyses of the CDS spreads in Panel B indicate 
that even though there is a difference with regard to changes in credit ratings, there is no 
difference with regard to changes in CDS spreads and hence credit quality.  
 
4. Research Design and Results 
We examine the effect of changes in credit rating labels on investment using the 
following difference-in-differences specification: 
INVESTi,t = α + β1POST*HIGHAMLi,t + ∑γj Controls + Fixed Effects + εi,t (1) 
HIGHAML is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms whose average 
additional minimum liability scaled by total assets pre-SFAS158 is above the median of the firms 
in our sample. This variable identifies those firms where the probability of an upgrade generated 
by the rating agency correction is highest (Basu and Naughton, 2017). POST is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for firm-quarters after the implementation of SFAS158 (i.e., 
calendar year 2007).  
We use four different variables to proxy for investment behavior: CAPEX equals firms’ 
capital expenditure, which is calculated as the change in firms’ property, plant, and equipment 
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plus depreciation and scaled by lagged total assets. CASH ACCUMULATION equals the 
change in firms’ cash and cash equivalents and scaled by lagged total assets. ASSET GROWTH 
equals the change in firm’s book value of total assets and scaled by lagged total assets. INVEST 
is the change in NOA scaled by average total assets. Change in NOA is calculated as change in 
non-cash assets minus the change in non-debt liabilities; non-cash assets is calculated as total 
assets minus cash and short-term investments; non-debt liabilities is calculated as total liabilities 
plus minority interest less debt. We control for various factors identified in prior research as 
determinants of firm investment and credit worthiness. These control variables are described in 
Section 3. We include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved correlated 
variables. We also include year-fixed effects to capture the influence of aggregate time-series 
trend. We cluster all the standard errors by firm.  
The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β1, the coefficient on the interaction term 
HIGHAML*POST. This coefficient captures the difference in the change in investment behavior 
between the treatment firms (i.e., those firms with a higher probability of a rating upgrade in 
response to the SFAS158) and the control firms (i.e., those firms with a lower probability of a 
rating upgrade in response to the SFAS158). To the extent that an exogenous credit rating 
upgrade leads to a decrease (increase) in investment, we expect β1< 0 (β1 > 0). To the extent that 
an exogenous credit rating upgrade leads to a decrease (increase) in cash accumulation, we 
expect β1> 0 (β1 < 0). 
The results from equation (1) are presented in Table 4. The coefficient β1 is statistically 
significant in each specification. In column (1), the coefficient indicates that there was a 
statistically significant increase in CAPEX for HIGHAML firms relative to LOWAML firms. 
The results are similar across the other specifications. Column (2) indicates that HIGHAML 
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firms held less cash than LOWAML firms, column (3) indicates that HIGHAML firms 
experienced a differential increase in the book value of assets relative to LOWAML firms, and 
column (4) indicates that HIGHAML firms increased investment relative to LOWAML firms. 
Collectively, these results suggest that the correction in the credit rating methodology led to 
meaningful changes in the level of investment at affected firms.  
The analyses in Table 4 compare 3 years of pre-SFAS158 data with 3 years of post-
SFAS158 data. In Table 5, we confirm that our results are not driven by this research design 
choice. We consider three other time periods: 2004—2007, which allows us to identify whether 
the change in investment occurred immediately following the implementation of SFAS158; 
2002—2014, which allows us to identify whether the change in investment was present over a 
longer time period; and 2002—2004 without the financial crisis years of 2007 and 2008 to 
ensure that our findings are not driven by the unusual economic activity during the financial 
crisis. For brevity, we only show the results using CAPEX. In each specification, the coefficient 
on the HIGHAML*POST interaction term is positive and significant, and also close in 
magnitude to the corresponding coefficient in Table 4, column (1). Collectively, these results 
suggest that our conclusions are not sensitive to the time period studied. 
Next, we examine whether there are also effects on firms’ financial policy, and in 
particular, whether there is a change in firms’ use of debt. We examine the effect of changes in 
credit rating labels on financial policy using the following difference-in-differences 
specification: 
POLICYi,t = α + β1POST*HIGHAMLi,t + ∑γj Controls + Fixed Effects + εi,t (2) 
All independent variables and the fixed effect structure are the same as those used in 
equation (1). We proxy for firms’ financial policy using four different variables: NET DEBT 
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ISSUANCE, which is equal to long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction; NET 
EQUITY ISSUANCE , which is equal to the sale of common and preferred stock minus 
purchases of common and preferred stock; NET DEBT LESS EQUITY, which is equal to the 
difference in the prior two variables; and SHORT TERM DEBT, which is equal to short term debt 
issuance scaled by lagged total assets. 
Once again, the coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β1, the coefficient on the 
interaction term HIGHAML*POST. This coefficient captures the difference in the change in 
financial policy between the treatment firms (i.e., those firms with a higher probability of a rating 
upgrade in response to the SFAS158) and the control firms (i.e., those firms with a lower 
probability of a rating upgrade in response to the SFAS158). To the extent that an exogenous 
credit rating upgrade leads to an increase (decrease) in the use of debt, we expect β1 > 0 (β1  < 0).  
The results from equation (2) are presented in Table 5. The coefficient β1 is statistically 
significant in each specification that considers the firm’s use of debt (i.e., columns (1), (3) and 
(4)). In column (1), the coefficient indicates that there was a statistically significant increase in 
the use of long term debt. In contrast, the coefficient in column (2) indicates that there was no 
statistically detectable change in equity issuance. Collectively, these two results suggest that 
HIGHAML firms did not adjust their use of equity financing, but did increase their use of debt 
financing relative to LOWAML firms. The results in columns (3) and (4) provide additional 
support for this conclusion. The coefficient on the difference between debt and equity financing 
is also positive, indicating that in total, HIGHAML firms were raising more capital relative to 
LOWAML firms. The results in column (4) indicate that these firms were also increasing their 





We show that errors by credit rating agencies can have significant real effects on rated 
firms. We show that HIGHAML firms are more likely to experience an improvement in credit 
rating post-SFAS158 relative to LOWAML firms even though there is no detectable change in 
the credit quality of these firms relative to LOWAML firms. In addition, HIGHAML firms are 
more likely to increase capital investment and shift capital structure toward debt financing post-
SFAS158 relative to LOWAML firms. Overall, our results indicate that credit rating errors have 
real economic consequences for rated firms because credit rating labels drive economic choices 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
CAPEX 
Firms’ capital expenditure, which is calculated as the change in 
firms’ property, plant, and equipment plus depreciation and scaled 








Change in firm’s book value of total assets and scaled by lagged 
total assets 
 
NET DEBT ISSUANCE Long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction Compustat 
NET EQUITY 
ISSUANCE 
Sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common 
and preferred stock  
Compustat 
SHORT TERM DEBT Short term debt issuance scaled by lagged total assets Compustat 
INVEST 
Change in NOA scaled by average total assets. Change in NOA is 
calculated as change in non-cash assets minus the change in non-
debt liabilities; non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus 
cash and short-term investments; non-debt liabilities is calculated 
as total liabilities plus minority interest less debt 
Compustat 
Panel B: Pension Accounting Variables  
PBPRO Projected Benefit Obligation Compustat 
PPLAO Pension Assets Compustat 
S87AML 
S87AML is the additional minimum liability prior to SFAS158 
scaled by total assets. Liabilities are recorded as negative values.  
Compustat 
HIGH (LOW) AML 
Indicator variable set to one for firms where the size of the firm’s 
Additional Minimum Liability adjustment pre-SFAS158 




An indicator variable that takes the value of one for fiscal quarters 
that end after December 31, 2006 and before December 31, 2009; 
and takes the value of zero for fiscal quarters that end after 
December 31, 2004 and before December 31, 2006  
Constructed 
Panel C: Firm-Level Determinants of Investments 
SIZE Log of assets (ATQ)  Compustat 
LEVERAGE 
Sum of Long-term (DLTTQ) and short-term debt (DLCQ) over 
Total Assets (ATQ)), 
Compustat 
ROA Net Income (NIQ) over Total Assets (ATQ) Compustat 
MTB Ratio of market value of equity divided by book value of equity Compustat 
TANGIBILITY Net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) over assets (ATQ) Compustat 
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Variable Description Data Source 
Panel D: Other Controls 
Pension Assets Pension Assets (PPLAO) divided by Total Assets (AT) Compustat 
RENT 
Rental payments (XRENT) divided by assets (AT), measured at 
the end of fiscal year t 
Compustat 
INTCOV EBITDA (OIBDPQ) over net interest expense (XINTQ) Compustat 
PROFITVOL 
Standard deviation of ROA over the last ﬁve years, or at least 
the last two years if insufficient data 
Compustat 
DEBTCOV 
Sum of Long-term (DLTTQ) and short-term debt (DLCQ) over 
EBITDA (OIBDP)), or zero if ratio is negative for fiscal 
quarter t 
Compustat 
NegDEBTCOV Equals 1 if DEBTCOV is negative 
Compustat 
 
Panel D: Credit Variables   
S&P RATING 
Standard & Poor's Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(SPLTICRM) issued three months after the end of year t, 
translated into a numerical scale by adding one for each rating 
notch. Thus, a AAA rating becomes 1, AA+ becomes 2, AA 
becomes 3, etc., up to a score of 21 for a rating of C. 
WRDS 
CDS_Spread 
Average daily five-year CDS spread (measured in basis points) 










Figure 1: Comparison of Recognized Pension Liability with S&P Adjustment 
 
This figure illustrates the calculation of each pension variable used in our analyses. The data are for the 2005 and 2006 fiscal years (i.e., the year prior to and the year of 
the implementation of SFAS158). Liabilities are shown as negative numbers (i.e., in parentheses). The last two items show that the total pension liability on the S&P 
adjusted financial statements is greater than the total unfunded projected benefit obligation for each of these example firms for the 2005 fiscal year but not for the 2006 
fiscal year.  
 
Variable Description Source/Calculation Example 1 Example 2 
conm Company Name Compustat 3M CO COLGATE  
gvkey GVKEY Compustat 7435 3170 
fyear Fiscal year Compustat 2005 2006 2005 2006 
pbaco Accumulated Benefit Obligation Compustat (12,716) (13,316) (1,954) (2,127) 
pbpro Projected Benefit Obligation Compustat (13,936) (14,599) (2,121) (2,302) 
pplao Pension Assets Compustat 12,625  14,030  1,593  1,798  
pcupso Unrecognized Prior Service Cost Compustat 7  (1) 0  0  
poajo Other Adjustments Compustat 3,636  2,929  641  551  
pcppao (Accrued)/Prepaid Pension Cost Compustat 2,332  2,359  113  47  
S87_MIN Minimum Liability min(0,pplao+pbaco) (91) 0  (361) (329) 
S87_AML Additional Minimum Liability if S87_MIN ≠ 0, S87_MIN - pcppao (2,423) 0  (474) (376) 
S87_REC Total Pension (Liability)/Asset under SFAS87 S87_AML + pcppao (91) 2,359  (361) (329) 
S158_REC Total Pension (Liability)/Asset under SFAS158 pplao + pbpro (1,311) (569) (528) (504) 
S158_ADDL Additional Pension (Liability)/Asset due to SFAS158 S158_REC - S87_REC (1,220) (2,928) (167) (175) 
 
Total Pension (Liability)/Asset on Unadjusted  
Financial Statements 
S87_REC or S158_REC (91) (569) (361) (504) 
SP_PEN_ 
ADJ 
Total Pension S&P Adjustment CreditStats Direct (2,706) 0  (438) 0  
 
Total Pension (Liability)/Asset on S&P Adjusted 
Financial Statements 
Pension_REC + SP_ADJ (2,797) (569) (799) (504) 
DB_ 
FUNDING 





Figure 2: Illustration of Time Series Changes in Firm Investment 
This figure illustrates the time series variation in firm investment for HIGHAML versus LOWAML firms around 
the adoption of SFAS158. LOWAML firms have higher levels of investment than HIGHAML firms prior to 
SFAS158, and this difference narrows in the post-SFAS158 period.  
 

















Table 1: Sample Composition by Industry  
 
Fama-French 12 Industries Code Unique Firms Firm-Quarters 
Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco 38 882 
Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture 23 470 
Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Plants 111 2,209 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 29 688 
Chemicals and Allied Products 40 840 
Business Equipment -- Computers, Software 32 707 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services  38 792 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 24 506 
Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans 25 531 
Total 360 7,625 
 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses  
 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Dependent Variables:       
CAPEX 7,625 0.014 0.022 0.005 0.01 0.018 
CASH ACCUMULATION 8,006 0.001 0.059 -0.014 0.002 0.022 
ASSET GROWTH 7,977 0.017 0.082 -0.014 0.011 0.036 
NET DEBT ISSUANCE 6,847 0.002 0.039 -0.007 0 0.001 
NET EQUITY ISSUANCE 7,208 -0.006 0.014 -0.005 0 0 
SHORT TERM DEBT 7,854 0.032 0.046 0.002 0.014 0.046 
INVEST 7,803 0.007 0.106 -0.029 0.005 0.036 
Control Variables: 
SIZE 8,006 8.426 1.275 7.577 8.328 9.297 
LEVERAGE 8,006 0.283 0.161 0.177 0.262 0.366 
ROA 8,006 0.012 0.024 0.004 0.013 0.022 
MTB 8,006 0.492 0.397 0.272 0.429 0.641 
TANGIBILITY 8,006 0.29 0.195 0.141 0.237 0.398 
DEBTCOV 8,006 16.355 24.864 4.447 8.087 14.843 
Neg.DEBTCOV 8,006 0.026 0.158 0 0 0 
RENT 8,006 0.016 0.024 0.006 0.01 0.016 
PROFITVOL 8,006 0.01 0.017 0.002 0.005 0.012 
INTCOV 8,006 14.534 24.962 4.436 8.846 15.619 
PENSION ASSETS 8,006 0.137 0.159 0.026 0.086 0.183 
Rating Variables:       
RATING 7,918 10.209 3.13 8 10 13 
5-yr CDS Spread 4,763 1.746 4.656 0.338 0.672 1.758 
       
 






Table 3: Validation of SFAS158 Setting  
Panel A: Ex-post Changes in Credit Ratings in the year 2007 
 Long-term Credit Ratings 
 
 Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
9.90 9.99 0.09 
N=2,059 N=676  
LOWAML (ii) 
10.28 10.71 0.42*** 
N=1,180 N=682  
 (i)-(ii) (0.38) (0.72)** (0.33)** 
 
    
 
% (Count) Of firms that experienced credit ratings changes in the year 2007 
  # Upgrades # No Change # Downgrades 
  (a) (b) (c) 
HIGHAML (i) 
29.2% 37.6% 33.1% 
N=52 N=67 N=59 
LOWAML (ii) 
22.5% 39.6% 37.9% 
N=41 N=72 N=69 
      
 
Panel B: Ex-post Changes in CDS Spreads in the year 2007 
 5-Year CDS Spreads 
 
 Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
1.04 1.05 0.01 
N=1,215 N=431  
LOWAML (ii) 
1.03 1.11 0.08 
N=2,027 N=399  
 (i)-(ii) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) 
      
HIGHAML (LOWAML) is an indicator variable set to one for firms where the size of the firm’s Additional Minimum 
Liability adjustment pre-SFAS158 is above (below) the sample median (see Basu and Naughton, 2017). We 
transform the categorical long-term credit ratings in to a continuous measure where higher value represents lower 
ratings. Panel A presents the ex-post changes in credit ratings for the high (low) AML samples around SFAS158 
implementation Panel B presents the ex-post changes in 5-year CDS spreads for the high (low) AML samples around 
SFAS158 implementation.  
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Table 4: Change in Corporate Investment  
 
Results from an OLS estimation of Corporate Investment behavior on HIGHAML. Column (1), (2), (3) and (4) 
presents the effect of HIGHAML on CAPEX, Change in Cash, Asset Growth and Investment respectively. 
HIGAML is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s Additional Minimum Liability adjustment pre-
SFAS158 (S87AML) is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of 360 firms from 2004-
2009. A positive coefficient on HIGHAML*Post indicates that firms with high AML experienced, on average, an 
increase in that dependent variable in the post period. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 








 INVEST = 
ΔNOA/0.5(AT 
+ Lag AT) 
        
HIGHAML*POST 0.004*** -0.010** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
  (3.216) (2.049) (3.118) (2.833) 
Rating Controls     
SIZE 0.010*** -0.013 0.048*** 0.048***  
(4.609) (1.446) (8.538) (7.201) 
MTB -0.002 -0.010** -0.008 -0.006  
(1.331) (2.222) (1.554) (1.035) 
LEVERAGE 0.012** -0.026 0.109*** 0.142***  
(2.384) (1.316) (5.527) (5.113) 
ROA 0.101*** -0.017 0.898*** 0.798***  
(5.180) (0.352) (12.785) (8.220) 
DEBTCOV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
(0.581) (0.381) (0.186) (0.009) 
NegDEBTCOV -0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.022*  
(0.870) (0.749) (0.190) (1.888) 
RENT 0.088 1.070** 0.420 0.808** 
 (1.335) (2.152) (1.603) (2.220) 
PROFITVOL -0.031 0.108 -0.061 -0.079 
 (0.675) (0.761) (0.558) (0.535) 
INTCOV 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (3.010) (0.948) (1.225) (2.436) 
TANGIBILITY 0.071*** -0.197*** -0.078*** -0.002 
 (5.206) (3.945) (3.029) (0.061) 
PENSION ASSETS -0.019** -0.053 -0.091*** -0.066* 
 (2.315) (1.279) (3.086) (1.682) 
     
Number of Firm-Qtrs. 7,629 8,010 7,981 7,803 
Adjusted R-squared 0.230 0.077 0.147 0.057 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5: Change in Corporate Investment over Various Sample Periods 
 
Results from an OLS estimation of Corporate Investment behavior on HIGHAML. Column (1), (2), (3) presents the 
effect of HIGHAML on CAPEX for the vintages 2004-2007, 2002-2014 and 2002-2014 excluding the 2007-2008 
financial crisis years. HIGAML is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s Additional Minimum 
Liability adjustment pre-SFAS158 (S87AML) is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of 
360 firms from 2004-2009. A positive coefficient on HIGHAML*Post indicates that firms with high AML 
experienced, on average, an increase in corporate investment in the post period. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. 
All variables are defined in Appendix: A 
 







       
HIGHAML*Post 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (2.930) (2.997) (2.791) 
Rating Controls    
SIZE 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.005***  
(7.955) (5.066) (4.685) 
MTB -0.002 -0.004*** -0.005***  
(0.828) (3.661) (4.150) 
LEVERAGE 0.023*** 0.002 0.003  
(3.104) (0.570) (0.677) 
ROA 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.114***  
(3.460) (7.668) (6.989) 
DEBTCOV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
(1.527) (1.352) (0.695) 
NegDEBTCOV 0.007** -0.002 -0.002  
(2.053) (1.026) (0.621) 
RENT 0.088 0.027 0.010 
 (0.800) (0.648) (0.214) 
PROFITVOL 0.038 -0.060** -0.059** 
 (0.837) (2.433) (2.241) 
INTCOV 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.913) (2.482) (2.391) 
TANGIBILITY 0.132*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 
 (10.207) (5.637) (4.360) 
PENSION ASSETS -0.038** -0.009* -0.010** 
 (1.970) (1.963) (2.014) 
    
Number of Firms 5,219 15,074 11,702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.278 0.195 0.190 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 






Table 6: Change in Financial Policy  
 
Results from an OLS estimation of Corporate Financing behavior on HIGHAML. Column (1), (2), (3), (4) presents 
the effect of HIGHAML on Net Debt Issuance, Net Equity Issuance, Net Debt less Equity and Short term Debt 
respectively. HIGAML is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s Additional Minimum Liability 
adjustment pre-SFAS158 (S87AML) is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of 360 firms 
from 2004-2009. A positive coefficient on HIGHAML*Post indicates that firms with high AML experienced, on 
average, an increase in the dependent variable in the post period. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 







Debt - Equity 
Short Term 
Debt 
       
HIGHAML*Post 0.006*** 0.001 0.006** 0.009*** 
  (2.872) (0.856) (2.507) (2.599) 
Rating Controls     
SIZE 0.018*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.008  
(5.911) (0.400) (5.463) (1.629) 
MTB 0.000 0.001*** -0.002 -0.006**  
(0.015) (2.803) (0.738) (2.566) 
LEVERAGE 0.108*** 0.001 0.116*** 0.128***  
(8.627) (0.488) (8.025) (6.412) 
ROA -0.022 -0.055*** 0.034 -0.017  
(0.721) (6.083) (0.948) (0.664) 
DEBTCOV 0.000** -0.000 0.000* -0.000  
(2.084) (1.068) (1.901) (1.484) 
NegDEBTCOV 0.007 -0.002*** 0.011** 0.005  
(1.382) (2.601) (2.117) (0.862) 
RENT 0.144 0.063 0.070 0.061 
 (1.262) (1.337) (0.505) (0.459) 
PROFITVOL -0.059 0.015 -0.074 0.043 
 (1.039) (1.129) (1.197) (0.751) 
INTCOV 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.286) (0.768) (1.513) (0.739) 
TANGIBILITY -0.023* -0.001 -0.022 0.027 
 (1.650) (0.141) (1.461) (1.416) 
PENSION ASSET -0.024* -0.009* -0.015 0.008 
 (1.799) (1.818) (1.010) (0.316) 
     
Number of Firm-Qtrs. 6,851 7,212 6,281 7,858 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.308 0.073 0.493 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
